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analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is deter-
mined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the
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three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curb-
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1 Introduction
Even though global foreign direct investment (FDI) has faced two major
negative shocks since the turn of the century, the stock of foreign capital in
most countries is much higher than several decades ago. Some authors argue
that the economic influence of firms on the political process has grown due
to this aspect of globalization. This perception sometimes culminates in the
notion of the “loss of sovereignty” of the nation state. According to this view,
national governments lose their discretion to set policy, e.g. environmental
regulation, because multinational enterprises have a better bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis the government than national firms: the former can relocate
in response to unwanted policies, and governments that want to avoid such
relocation must succumb to the wishes of the multinationals. According to
this view, a “race to the bottom” ensues when multinational firms are im-
portant. Regulation becomes excessively lax so as to attract multinational
firms. Contrasting this view is the “Not in my backyard” (NIMBY) story,
according to which governments set inefficiently high pollution standards to
deter polluting multinational firms.
This paper deals with a single government that regulates a polluting
monopolist. In a setting closely related to Motta and Thisse (1994), we first
focus on the interaction between location patterns, transportation costs and
the choice of regulation in a simple parameterized game, and we determine
all equilibria of the game. We then show that important insights still hold in
a reduced form approach where we relax assumptions on specific functional
forms and on the particular type of product market interaction.
Specifically, we compare the regulation of a national firm which, by defini-
tion, can only produce in the home country with the regulation of a multina-
tional firm which can relocate its production to a foreign country. Relocation
can either be partial (in which case only the foreign market is served from
the foreign plant) or complete (in which case the home market is served from
the foreign plant, too). Our modelling approach allows both for the case
that regulators maximize welfare and the alternative that they take private
benefits into account, which makes them susceptible to influence activities.
We derive regulation levels for arbitrary parameters of the game for na-
tional and multinational firms. We then ask under which circumstances
national and multinational firms face stronger regulation. As a benchmark,
we consider the case that regulators maximize consumer surplus, that is,
completely ignore the effects of regulation on producer surplus.
We identify several countervailing effects. First, there is the easier-to-
shut-down effect. Compared to national firms, the government can induce
zero production of the multinational without foregoing consumer surplus al-
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together. This can lead to situations where the multinational is induced to
relocate completely, whereas the national firm still produces. Second, there
is the easier-to-curb-exports effect. A government that wants the firm to stop
its polluting exports needs lower regulation for the multinational than for the
national firm, so that the multinational produces more. Finally, there is the
multiple-plant effect. For parameters such that the government allows the
national firm to export, but the multinational exercises the option of partial
relocation, the multinational produces less at home (and hence pollutes less)
even when both firms face the same level of regulation.
For the case of pure consumer surplus maximization, we show that, as a
result of these effects, multinational firms tend to be more regulated (produce
lower outputs and emissions) than national firms when transportation costs
are low, whereas the converse effect may arise for high transportation costs,
provided the environmental damage parameter is high enough. We then an-
alyze how an increase of political influence affects the choice of regulation,
and to which extent the effects differ for national or multinational firms.
There are countervailing effects which result in a shift of the region where
multinationals produce less than national firms towards higher damage levels.
Finally, we consider welfare. In the case of pure consumer surplus maximiza-
tion, welfare always is higher for multinational firms than for national firms.
With lobbying, the result is reversed for some parameter regions.
Several theoretical and empirical contributions analyze whether the abil-
ity of multinationals to relocate production leads to “pollution havens” which
have low regulation in order to attract foreign capital.1 Even though early
empirical research found it hard to confirm this effect, recent contributions
provide evidence that regulation has an impact on relocation of firms.2 The
theoretical literature on the regulation of multinational firms has usually
taken the perspective that governments maximize national welfare. For in-
stance, Rauscher (1995) considers a game between several governments whose
pollution taxes determine the location of a monopolist who, contrary to our
1The approaches differ concerning the modeling of competition, relocation, transporta-
tion costs and government behavior. Important contributions are Conrad (2005), Eerola
(2004), Markusen et. al. (1993), Hoel (1997), Rauscher (1995), Motta and Thisse (1994).
Conrad (2005: 275-277) provides a rough overview.
2Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) survey the empirical literature, which consists of
two branches. Authors such as Condliffe (2009), List and Co (2000) or Zugravu and
Ben Kheder (2008) directly measure the effect of environmental regulation on location
decisions. Others analyse the link between trade and regulation (Levinson and Taylor
(2008), Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2005)). In sum, these studies provide evidence
that there is an effect of environmental regulation on location decisions. The impact differs
and depends on factors like the industry’s ability to relocate, the role of abatements costs
and other aspects of productivity.
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model, can only be active in at most one country. He finds that, for local
pollutants, the race to the bottom outcome is observed for relatively low
environmental damages, whereas the NIMBY case arises for higher damages.
Our approach is closely related to Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993,
1995) and Motta and Thisse (1994). In these papers, a multinational firm
chooses its location structure as a function of home country policy. The
firm can either partially or completely relocate as a reaction to unwanted
regulation. In doing so it faces a trade-off which depends on the fixed costs
of relocation, transportation costs and the cost of regulation.3
However, the question how lobbying influences regulation if firms can re-
locate production has hardly been addressed in the literature so far.4 Most
closely related to our paper, Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006) analyze
lobbying activities of multinational and national firms against environmen-
tal regulation if local production causes pollution damages. Contrary to our
paper, the authors assume that the market structure is exogenous and focus
on the question how the number of foreign plants affects the outcome. Bel-
letini and Kempf (2008) analyze a setup where a government decides about
the spatial allocation of production plants, which serve as a public good or
bad (like an airport or a waste disposal plant). They analyze how lobbying
influences the allocation decision and show that under certain conditions lob-
bying may lead to over- or underprovision of the public good. Fredriksson
(2000) analyzes the allocation of a plant which exerts negative externalities
in a NIMBY setting, where each region lobbies against the location of the
plant at its own site but benefits from its existence somewhere else.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives
the locational choices of firms for given regulation levels. In Section 4, we
characterize the regulation for national and multinational firms, respectively.
Section 5 compares regulation levels in the two cases, and it shows how
lobbying affects the comparison. Section 6 deals with welfare issues. Section
7 generalizes the approach in a reduced form model. Section 8 concludes.
3The approaches differ according to the exact modeling of product market interaction
(duopoly vs. monopoly), the type of firms that can relocate (only domestic firms or foreign
firms as well), the effect of damages on welfare (linear or convex) and the type of policy
instruments.
4Most papers dealing with lobbying of multinational firms focus on their influence
on trade policy. Several authors analyze incentives to lobby for protection if FDI puts
a potential threat on domestic firms, i.e. Grossman and Helpman 1996, Ellingson and
Warneryd 1999, Konishi, Saggi and Weber 1999.
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2 Assumptions
We consider a multi-stage game. There are two countries, i = 1 (home) and
i = 2 (foreign). There is one firm that initially only has one plant in the
home country. This firm can be national or multinational. A multinational
firm is defined by the option to build another plant in the foreign country.
We assume that a politician in country 1 maximizes a “welfare function”
(W ), a weighted sum of consumer surplus in the home country (K), total
firm profits (Π) and the costs of environmental damage in the home country
(D):
W = K + γΠ−D,
where γ ≥ 0. The game has the following stages:
1. The politician chooses the regulation level r so as to maximize W .
2. If the firm is multinational, it decides whether to build an additional
plant in the foreign location at fixed cost F ; a national firm is defined
by the absence of this option.
3. The profit-maximizing firm chooses xij, i, j = 1, 2, which denote the
output levels produced in country i for country j.
We write xi = (xi1 + x
i
2) for total output produced in country i, and
xj =
(
x1j + x
2
j
)
for total output produced for country j. Further, we write
x = (x11, x
1
2, x
2
1, x
2
2). Partial relocation (P) occurs if x
1 > 0 and x2 > 0, that
is, production takes place in both countries. There is complete relocation (C)
if x1 = 0, x2 > 0, that is, all production takes place in country 2. If x2 = 0 ,
we say that there is no relocation (N).
We assume that the firm is a monopolist on both markets who faces
linear demand pi = a− xi in country i = 1, 2. We assume constant marginal
production costs, which we set to 0 for simplicity. If a market is served from
another country, the firm incurs transportation costs t > 0 per unit output.
Regulation is assumed to lead to additional costs r that are proportional to
output. Profits are thus
2∑
j=1
pj(xj)xj − rx1 − t
(
x12 + x
2
1
)− δF (1)
where δ = 1 if there is complete or partial relocation, δ = 0 otherwise,
that is, for a national firm or a multinational firm that does not relocate.
Environmental damages are given as b (x1)
2
, where b > 0. In the foreign
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country, there is no regulation. The model thus has the exogenous parameters
a, F, b, t, γ. The regulation level r is endogenous, as is the location choice and
more generally the output vector x.
2.1 Lobbying interpretation
The welfare function can account for the cases that the politician is either
benevolent or influenced by lobbying of firms. In the former case γ reflects
the weight that the benevolent politician gives to producer surplus.5 In the
latter case, a standard lobbying game (similar to Grossman and Helpman
1994) maps directly into our simpler framework. To this end, we add a first
stage in which the firm offers a contribution schedule C(r) to the politician,
which maps a particular level of regulation to a contribution that the firm
pays to the politician. The firm’s objective function thus becomes pi(r) =
Π (r) − C (r), that is, profits minus contributions. Next the politician sets
regulation levels so as to maximize U(r) = Ŵ (r) + βC(r), where β ≥ 0
and Ŵ (r) = K + γ̂Π − D is the “true” welfare function where the weight
parameter γ̂ reflects normative considerations.
In Appendix A, we show that the regulation level resulting from this more
complex game maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and profits. The weight γ
of profits is the sum of the true weight γ̂ and the politicians concern for private
benefits (β). Thus, our simpler game can be regarded as a reduced form of
the more complex lobying game. We also show that, if the politician cares
much about welfare, β is small, and the firm must offer high compensation
payments to induce a policy deviation of a given size.6
3 Firm behavior
We first describe the behavior of a multinational firm for given regulation; the
case of national firms is trivial because the locational structure is fixed as N .
Intuitively, firms face simple trade-offs between locational choices. Compared
to complete relocation, no relocation means saving fixed costs, but incurring
the costs of regulation. Compared to partial relocation, no relocation means
saving fixed costs, but incurring transportation costs and regulation costs.
5Typically γ ≤ 1 would be assumed, reflecting either distributional preferences for
consumers or foreign ownership of assets.
6The politician’s payoff is independent of β because he is exactly compensated for the
equilibrium policy deviation and his marginal benefit of contribution payments (captured
by β) is small.
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Compared to complete relocation, partial relocation involves saving trans-
portation costs, but incurring regulation costs.
The following assumptions guarantee that (i) it is possible to earn positive
profits in a country that is served from abroad and (ii) the profits that can be
obtained in the unregulated foreign country from serving this country locally
outweigh the fixed costs.
Assumption 1 (i) t < a, (ii) a2 > 4F .
In Appendix B.1, we show that, for optimal output choices, profits in the
different locational regimes are:
ΠN (r) =

1
4
[
2a2 − 2a (t+ 2r) + (t+ r)2 + r2] if r ≤ a− t
1
4
[a2 − 2ar + r2] if a− t < r ≤ a
0 if a < r
ΠP (r) = 1
4
[2a2 − 2ar + r2 − 4F ] if r ≤ a
ΠC (r) = 1
4
[2a2 − 2at+ t2 − 4F ] (2)
ΠN (r) can also be interpreted as the profit of a national firm. The case
r ≤ a− t is relevant when both markets are served: The joint costs of trans-
portation and regulation are not too high to prevent exports. If a−t < r ≤ a,
no profits can be earned from serving the foreign country because combined
transportation costs and regulation are too high, whereas regulation is not
too costly to stop production altogether. For a < r regulation alone suffices
to choke production even for the home-country market.
The multinational will choose the location l(r) ∈ {C,N, P} that max-
imizes Πl (r). Straightforward calculations (see Appendix B.2) show that
there are critical levels of regulation, r1 = r1 (a, t, F ) and r2 = r2 (a, t, F )
and r3 = t such that location choice is given as
7
l(r) =

N if r ≤ min {r1, r2}
P if r1 < r < r3
C if r ≥ max {r3, r2}
(3)
Figure 1 illustrates how the location decisions depend on the parameters
of the game.
Increases in a and decreases in F reduce the no-relocation region, because
lower relocation costs F promote relocation, and higher demand a makes it
more worthwhile to incur the fixed cost of relocation.8
7To see this, one has to identify where ΠN = ΠP , ΠP = ΠC and ΠN = ΠC and which
location choice yields higher profits on which side of these lines of equal profits.
8This result can be derived by straightforward calculation based on the functions de-
scribing the boundaries between the three regions, i.e. on the equations (3) describing the
location choice l(r).
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Figure 1: Location decisions of the multinational.
For later purposes, we highlight the role of transportation costs.
Lemma 1: There exist values t1 = t1(a, F ), t2 = t2(a, F ) such that
(i) For t ≤ t1, the firm chooses no relocation for low values of regulation
and complete relocation for high levels. Partial relocation never arises. (NC)
(ii) For t ≥ t2, the firm chooses partial relocation even for zero regulation
and relocates completely for high levels of regulation (PC).
(iii) For t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, the firm chooses no relocation for low values of
r, partial relocation for intermediate values and complete relocation for high
values. (NPC)
The proof is straightforward (see Appendix B.3).9 The intuition is simple:
(i) When t is low, it is never worthwhile to build a plant in the other country
to serve only this country. However, it can be worthwhile to avoid high
regulation costs by relocating completely. (ii) When t is very high, the firm
will always serve the other country locally even when there is no regulation.
(iii) For intermediate cases all locational patterns emerge for suitable r.
4 Determining regulation
In Section 4.1 we consider the optimal regulation for a national firm; we move
to multinational firms in Section 4.2.
9t1 corresponds to the intersection of all three regimes N , P and C, and t2 corresponds
to the value where the “ΠN = ΠP ”-line intersects with the x-axis.
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4.1 National Firms
In Appendix C we derive the expressions for welfare when the firm serves
both markets (r ≤ a− t) and when it produces only for the national market
(a− t < r ≤ a)10 and use them to characterize the optimal regulation.
Proposition 1 For γ1 ≡ b− 1
2
≤γ2 ≡ 2b− 1
2
≤ γ3 ≡ 2b− a
2(2a−t) , we have:
(i) If γ ≤ γ1, regulation is so high (r = a) that there is no production.
(ii) If γ1 < γ ≤ γ2, regulation is just high enough that production only occurs
for the home country (r = a− t).
(iii) If γ > γ2, there is production for both countries. If γ < γ3, r lies strictly
between 0 and a − t, and it is decreasing in γ and t, increasing in a and b.
If γ ≥ γ3, r = 0.
Proof : See Appendix D.
The result is intuitive: If the environmental problem is important and
firms do not have much weight, then production may be shut down com-
pletely. As the influence of firms increases, regulation will be softened to
allow production for the home country. Eventually, regulation becomes so
soft that the firm will produce for both countries, and there will be no reg-
ulation if the weight of the firm is sufficiently strong.11 The critical values
γ1, γ2, γ3 are increasing in b, because regulation levels depends on the trade-
off between damages and concern for producer rents. For very low b, there
is no regulation (even γ3 is negative). As the environmental problem be-
comes more severe (b increases), regulation increases gradually until the firm
no longer exports to the foreign country. Finally r becomes so high that
production is shut down altogether.
Appendix D contains a formula for r when there is an interior solution in
the regime where both markets are served. We will use this solution when
we compare national and multinational firms in Section 5.
10This also contains the case where the firm closes down production completely (r = a).
We do not discuss the possibility that r > a explicitly, because it is equivalent to r = a.
That the firm produces only for the home market if a − t < r can be seen directly from
the values for the optimal output for N (equations (7) in Appendix B.1).
11The result that there never is a solution in the interior of the regime with only home
country production should not be overemphasized: It comes from the fact that, in this
case, because of the specific functional forms we are employing, environmental damages
and consumer surplus are proportional to the square of local output.
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4.2 Regulation of Multinational Firms
We now characterize regulation of multinational firms:
Proposition 2 There exist γC1, γC2, γC3, γP2 such that the following state-
ments hold :12
(i) For t ≤ t1, complete relocation arises if and only if γ ≤ γC1; there is no
relocation for γ > γC1.
(ii) For t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, there is complete relocation if and only if γ ≤ γC2. There
is partial relocation if and only if γC2 < γ ≤ γP2. There is no relocation if
and only if γ > γP2.
(iii) For t > t2, there is complete relocation if and only if γ ≤ γC3. There is
partial relocation if and only if γC3 < γ.
Proof : See Appendix E.
To prove this result, one has to take the effects of regulation on location
decisions into account. Appendix C gives the corresponding welfare levels as
WN (r), W P (r) and WC (r), respectively. WN (r), the welfare in regime N ,
is the same as for the national firm.
In Appendix E, we specify Proposition 2 by calculating the regulation
levels for arbitrary parameterizations (Proposition 6), which will be useful
when we compare the regulation of national and multinational firms in the
next section. These calculations will show that higher b works in favor of
relocation, whereas increasing γ works against it. Furthermore, Proposition
6 shows that partial relocation only arises for sufficiently high transportation
costs (t > t1).
5 National vs. Multinational Firms
We now ask under which circumstances multinationals face stronger or weaker
regulation than national firms, respectively, first for γ = 0 and then for γ > 0.
Rather than comparing regulation levels directly, we take output levels, which
are essentially in a one-to-one relation.13
12 t1 and t2 are defined in Lemma 1 above. The quantities for the γ’s are defined in
Appendix E.
13An exception arises for the case of complete relocation, where the local output is 0,
but the regulation level is not well defined: Any regulation level that is is high enough to
induce complete relocation is equivalent.
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5.1 Pure Consumer Surplus Maximization
Suppose γ = 0. Fixing a = 4 and F = 3, we have the free parameters
t, b. The left panel of Figure 2 captures the relocation patterns for the
multinational (N,P or C), and it shows for which combinations of t and b the
multinational has higher domestic output than the national firm.
Figure 2: Left: γ = 0; right: γ = 0.5
Relocation regimes in the (t, b)-diagram are similar to those in the (t, r)-
diagram because more damaging pollutants induce more regulation:14
i) For t < t1, an increase in b leads from N to C.
ii) For t1 < t < t2, an increase in b leads from N to P to C.
iii) For t > t2, an increase in b leads from P to C.
14We emphasize that the boundaries for the three ranges of t with N and C; N,P and
C; and P and C; are however somewhat different, as the boundaries in the (t, r)-plane are
determined by the profits of the multinational alone, while the boundaries in the (t, b)-
plane are determined by welfare. There is a region (t1, t1∗) where each of the location
choices N,P and C would be chosen by the multinational for certain combinations of t and
r. In this region, however, due to welfare considerations, the government never chooses
values of r that would induce the multinational to choose P.
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As to the comparison between multinational and national firms, we find:
Result 1 a) The output of national and multinational firms is identical when
the damage parameter b is high or when b is low and t is intermediate (the
areas shaded grey in the left panel of Figure 2).
b) Multinational firms produce less than national firms (i) for intermediate
values of b and low t and (ii) for low b and high t.
c) Multinational firms produce more than national firms for intermediate
values of b and high t.
In the remainder of this subsection, we provide the intuition for these
observations, which should also clarify that the results are not an artefact of
the particular parameterization used in Figure 2.
To understand the intuition for a), note that for b ≥ 0.5 ((the upper grey
area) the multinational firm relocates completely (no domestic output) and
the national firm is driven out of the market (no output at all). Measured
in domestic output, the firms thus face equal regulation. For very low b and
intermediate t (the lower grey area), the outputs are the same because neither
firm is regulated. t has to be intermediate because (i) for very low t the
multinational firm would relocate even for low regulation and the government
would not prevent this because the resulting reduction in consumer surplus
is low, and (ii) for very high t, export is too costly for the firm, so that it
would choose partial relocation even for zero regulation.
As to b(i), in the part of C where the national firm produces (intermedi-
ate b, low t), the multinational firm trivially has lower domestic output than
the national firm. The environmental benefits from shutting down the multi-
national firm’s production are high, and for low transportation costs t, the
reduction in consumer surplus is low. With a national firm, the environmen-
tal benefits from shutting down would come at the costs of losing consumer
surplus altogether. This easier-to-shut-down effect implies that the regulator
is less reluctant to close down multinational firms.
As to b(ii), for high t, there is partial relocation of the multinational.
The left panel of figure 2 shows that there is a critical level of b, which is
increasing in t, below which the multinational produces a lower domestic
output than the national firm in regime P . To understand this, we focus
on the case t > t2, so that there is partial relocation even for b = 0.15
15For t1∗ < t < t2, the argument is similar. The multinational is still regulated mini-
mally, subject to the constraint that it relocates partially. However, this regulation level
now depends negatively on transportation costs (the downward-sloping part of the lower
boundary of P ), so that the multinational firm’s output will increase with transportation
costs. With this exception, the intuition for the observed patterns is similar than with
12
For b < 1
8
neither firm is regulated.16 Even though both firms face the
same regulation, the national firm which serves both markets produces more
output and thus more pollution than the multinational. This multiple-plant
effect is still present beyond b = 1
8
. While there still is no regulation of the
multinational firm, the national firm is regulated: This reflects the greater
benefits of regulating national firms which produce all their output in the
home country. With convex damages, the marginal damage for the partially
relocated firm is thus lower than for the national firm. The national firm
is regulated more and more as b increases. Nevertheless, the output of the
multinational firm in the home country is lower than for the national firm
for small b.
c) As b increases within regime P , the regulation of the national firm even-
tually becomes so strong that it produces less output than the multinational
firm which is still not regulated. This result can be explained as follows:
As environmental damages are large enough, the government wants the na-
tional firm to produce only for the home country. Whereas the multinational
firm does this even for r = 0 (because it has the alternative of production
abroad), the national firm only does it for r ≥ a − t. This is the easier-to-
curb-exports effect: To get rid of the multinational firm’s export production,
less regulation is needed and the output is correspondingly higher.
5.2 Increasing Influence of the Firm
We now assess the effects of a positive weight on the firm’s profit (γ > 0),
reflecting greater weight of producer surplus or greater importance of private
benefits in the regulator’s objective function. Clearly, regulation becomes
weaker for both firms as γ increases. The more interesting question is whether
it becomes more likely that the multinational faces less regulation than the
national firm or, conversely, that the national firm becomes regulated less,
that is which type of firms are better lobbyists. We will show that both
results can arise.
The right panel of figure 2 shows that an increase in γ has the following
effects:17
i) The complete relocation regime shifts upwards (both the lower and the
large t. For low b the government regulates neither firm. Beyond the level of b where
partial relocation is induced, the multinational firm is initially regulated more than the
national firm. As b increases, the regulator aims at choking off export production of the
national firm which requires stronger regulation than for the multinational.
16Use Proposition 1: For γ = 0 and b < 18 , γ
3 = 2b− 14 < 0 and hence r = 0.
17Note that as the critical value t2 is independent of γ, and t1∗ only changes slowly with
γ, the parameter regimes change mainly along the b-dimension.
13
upper boundary). The upward shift of the lower boundary says that there
are parameter values without domestic production of the multinational for
low γ, but with domestic production for high γ. Specifically, for t < t1∗, the
region where multinational firms produce the same output as the national
firm grows. The increasing weight of the multinational firm reduces the rele-
vance of the easier-to-shut-down effect in these regions, with the result that
the multinational no longer produces less than the national firm. The up-
ward shift of the upper boundary of the complete relocation regime arises
because the increasing influence of the national firm reduces the area where
its production is shut down.
For sufficiently high t and points just inside C, the increase in γ leads into
the part of P where multinational firms are regulated less than the national
firm and produce higher outputs; the easier-to-curb-exports effect kicks in.
Hence again lobbying reverses the ordering of the output levels in favor of
the multinational firms.
ii) The second effect arises only in P . As for γ = 0 there is a critical level
of b above which the multinational firm produces higher domestic output
than the national firm. This critical level increases in γ. Thus there is
a parameter region where a switch from multinational firms having higher
domestic output to national firms having higher domestic output arises as γ
increases. Intuitively, in the regime P , the regulation of the multinational
firm is independent of b. It is always as low as possible to just induce partial
relocation or it is at r = 0. For the national firm regulation is increasing
(and hence output is decreasing) in b. As γ increases, there is no effect on the
regulation of the multinational firm. However, the regulation of the national
firm becomes less stringent, so that the easier-to-curb-exports becomes less
relevant. Expressed more generally, the increasing influence of the firms
has a stronger impact on the regulation of the national firm, because this
firm obtains all of its profits in the home country, whereas the multinational
firm obtains a substantial part in the foreign country which is unaffected by
regulation.
6 Welfare
The results in the previous section strongly suggest that the welfare compari-
son between national and multinational firms is ambiguous. On the one hand,
where the multinational is induced to relocate, local pollution will decline.
On the other hand, relocation may lead to reductions in consumer surplus.
Of course, by choosing regulation accordingly, the government can avoid re-
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location if desired. At first glance, it might therefore seem that a country
is always better off with a multinational firm, because this adds the option
of inducing exit of an undesired firm without losing consumer surplus com-
pletely. However, an option that the government loses with a multinational
firm is to regulate the firm heavily and nevertheless have local production –
the firm will vote with the feet when regulation gets too stringent.
Figure 3: Left: γ = 0; right: γ = 0.2
In spite of these potential ambiguities, our model yields a very clear result:
For γ = 0, a country that faces a multinational firm is always better off than
with the national firm, except for a small region where regulation and welfare
are identical for both types of firms (grey area in the left panel in Figure 3).
The intuition can be obtained from this figure, which is closely related to
Figure 2. First, consider regime C: When the environmental damage is so
substantial that the production of the national firm is choked off entirely,
welfare is clearly higher with the multinational, because the multinational
still generates consumer surplus for the home country. As the environmental
damage parameter declines, the national firm is regulated less, so that it at
least produces for the local market: Contrary to the multinational firm, the
national firm therefore generates environmental damage, but because trans-
portation costs are fairly small, so are the losses in consumer surplus from
having a multinational rather than a local firm. In regime P , first consider
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low damage parameters. Then, contrary to the multinational firm, the na-
tional firm produces for both countries, thereby creating more pollution than
the multinational without generating more consumer surplus. As the pollu-
tion parameter increases, so that the government wants to curb exports of
the national firm, excessive regulation is necessary to induce this, so that the
multinational firm generates higher consumer surplus without substantially
more pollution.
The picture changes dramatically when lobbying is taken into account.
The right panel in Figure 3, which corresponds to the right panel in Figure
2, compares welfare (defined as pure consumer surplus minus damages) for
national and multinational firms when regulation is determined with γ = 0.5.
The picture shows that there now is a region where welfare with multinational
firms is lower than with national firms (shaded dark). In this region, there
is partial relocation, and the multinational firm produces more than the
national firm. Because of the easier-to-curb-export effects, the multinational
firm is regulated less than the national firm. This increases environmental
damages and reduces welfare compared to the national firm.
Figure 3 nicely illustrates the effects of lobbying on welfare: Even though
our setting is biased in the sense that a consumer-surplus maximizing gov-
ernment is always better off with multinationals, this changes with lobbying:
There are parameter regions (with fairly high environmental damage param-
eter) where the increasing influence activities reverse the welfare comparison.
We want to point out the the clear result for γ = 0 is due to the model
specification where both the consumer surplus and the damage function are
quadratic in output. For differing functional forms of these terms, the area
where welfare with multinational firms is lower than with national firms will
already emerge for γ = 0 or only for γ strictly positive, depending on the
specific characteristics of each of these terms.
7 Generalizations
We now show that the main insights of our analysis hold much more generally.
We work with assumptions on the demand structure, the nature of regulation
and the damage function which are compatible with our specific example.
As before, we suppose there are two countries i = 1, 2 and one firm, which
originally has a plant in country 1. However, regulation in country 2 can be
positive as well. We denote regulation levels as ri. There are parameters
capturing market demand a > 0, transportation costs t ≥ 0, relocation costs
F ≥ 0 and environmental damages b ≥ 0. Let θ = (a, b, t, F ). The firm
has three options for location decisions, namely “no relocation” (“N”), i.e. it
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produces in country 1 only, “complete relocation” (“C”), i.e. it produces in
country 2 only, and “partial relocation” (“P”), where production for country
1 takes place in country 1, production for country 2 takes place in country
two. We use the notation l (r1, r2; θ) to denote locational decisions N,P or C.
7.1 Profits and Locational Choices
We let piij (ri; a, t) denote the optimal profits of a firm that serves country
j from country i (gross of relocation costs); total gross profits of a firm
having taken the locational decision l are thus pil (ri, rj; a, t) ≡ pii1 (ri; a, t) +
pij2 (rj; a, t), with i = 1 = j for l =N, i = 2 = j for l =C, and i = 1, j = 2
for l =P. We let xij (ri; a, t), xl (ri, rj; a, t) denote the corresponding outputs.
Πl (ri, rj; a, t) = pil (ri, rj; a, t)− F denotes net profits.
Assumption 2 Let i = 1, 2.
(a) For i, j = 1, 2 and all a > 0; t > 0, there exists an rmax = rmax(a, t) such
that xij (ri; a, t) ≡ 0 and piij (ri; a, t) ≡ 0 for ri ≥ rmax.
(b) For ri ≤ rmax, piij and xij are (i) decreasing in ri and (ii) increasing in
a; (iii) decreasing in t for i 6= j and independent of t for i = j. As long as
xij > 0, the statements can be replaced with “strictly increasing” and “strictly
decreasing”, respectively.
(c) (i) xij (ri; a, t) ≡ xji (rj; a, t) and piij (ri; a, t) ≡ piji (rj; a, t)
(ii) x1j (r1; a, 0) ≡ x2j (r2; a, 0) and pi1j (r1; a, 0) ≡ pi2j (r2; a, 0) for r1 = r2,
(d) xij and piij are continuous in all arguments.
(e) limt→∞ piij (ri; a, t) = piji (rj; a, t) = 0 (for i 6= j),
lima→0 piij (ri; a, t) = 0 for j = 1, 2.
(f) xii(0; a, t) > 0 and piii(0; a, t) > 0.
These assumptions are fairly general. (a) states that there is a prohibitive
level of regulation. (b) stipulates that outputs and profits react to changes of
regulation and to market parameters in the expected way. (c) requires that
countries and firms are symmetric and differ only according to the type of
regulation. Assumptions (d) and (e) are innocuous regularity properties; (f)
states that outputs and profits are positive without regulation.
We show that the qualitative properties of Figure 1 hold if Assumption 2
does.
Proposition 3 (i) For all r2 ≥ 0 and all θ, l (0, r2; θ) 6= C.
(ii) For all (r2; θ) there exists r
∗
1 > 0 and t
∗ > 0 such that ∀r1 < r∗1 and
∀t < t∗, l (r1, r2; θ) = N .
(iii) For all (r2; θ) such that pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F there exists r∗ = r∗(r2; θ) > 0
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such that l (r1, r2; θ) = C for r1 > r
∗.
(iv) For all (r1, r2, a, F ) there exists a t
∗ > 0 such that l (r1, r2; θ) 6= P for
t < t∗. If pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F , then there is a t∗∗ such that l (r1, r2; θ) 6= N for
t > t∗∗.
Proof: See Appendix F
The proposition reflects the relocation structure of our specific model
in a more general context. First, complete relocation does not occur when
there is no regulation in the home country.18 Second, if regulation and trans-
portation costs are small, no relocation occurs. Third, provided that foreign
country regulation is not too high to prevent positive profits net of relocation
costs, complete relocation occurs for sufficiently high regulation in the home
country. Fourth, whether relocation is partial or complete depends on the
interaction between regulation and transportation costs: For low transporta-
tion costs, partial relocation is never optimal, while for higher transportation
costs partial relocation can be optimal and no relocation is never chosen.
7.2 The Choice of Regulation
We now introduce additional assumptions so that we can address the choice
of regulation.
Assumption 3 (a) The regulator maximizes a weighted sum of consumer
surplus (minus damages) and profits.
(b) Consumer surplus is a strictly increasing function of xi.
(c) Damages are continuous, weakly increasing functions of xi and b. For
b > 0, they are strictly increasing in xi; for positive xi, they are strictly in-
creasing in b. For b = 0, damages are 0 for all xi and hence the optimal
regulation is 0.
(d) For national and multinational firms, the optimal regulation is a contin-
uous function of all parameters as long as no change of location is induced.
As b→∞, the optimal regulation involves xi = 0.
We now ask to which extent the comparative analysis (Result 1) for the
pure consumer surplus case generalizes.
Proposition 4 Suppose γ = 0.
a) Fix a, F and r2.
(i) For every level of transportation costs, there exists a value of b such that
neither the national nor the multinational firm produces any output for b > b.
18Note that in this case partial relocation may occur due to high transportation costs.
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(ii) If t is sufficiently small, but positive, there exists b > 0 such that both
firms produce the same output level for b < b.
b) Fix a and F . Suppose r2 is sufficiently small. (i) If t is sufficiently
small, there exist b∗ and b∗ such that b∗ < b∗ and multinational firms pro-
duce less home-country output than national firms for b ∈ (b∗, b∗) . (ii) If t
is sufficiently large, there exist b˜ such that multinational firms produce less
home-country output than national firms for b < b˜.
Proof: See Appendix F
Result a) identifies the conditions under which both firms are regulated
so that they choose the same output levels. In qualitative terms, the regions
where this is the case correspond to those shaded grey in Figure 2. Result
b) uncovers the two forces because of which the multinational firm might
produce less than the national firm: Result (i) reflects the easier-to-shut-
down effect that arises for low transportation costs and intermediate values
of damages. Result (ii) generalizes the multiple-plant effect that arises for
large transportation costs and low damages.
However, note that we have not included a generalization of the result that,
for large transportation costs and intermediate values of the damage pa-
rameter, the multinational firm produces more output. While the logic of
the easier-to-curb-emissions effect is quite general, it merely implies that, if
there are some points in the partial relocation regime where it is optimal to
prevent exports of the national firm, then the multinational firm will be regu-
lated less for these values and produce larger outputs. While there are large
parameter regions where this logic is confirmed, there are also parameter
regions where this is not the case.
8 Conclusions
In a simple monopoly model, we investigated whether national or multina-
tional firms face stronger regulation. For low transportation costs, multina-
tionals exercise the option of relocation when environmental damages are high
(and hence regulation becomes stricter); national firms then produce at least
as much as multinationals. As transportation costs increase, the situation
is more complex. There is a large range of parameters for which multina-
tional firms relocate partly. In this parameter regime, the multinational firm
typically produces lower outputs than the national firm when environmental
damages are low. For intermediate transportation costs, these lower outputs
reflect more stringent regulation; for higher transportation costs they simply
result from the fact that the multinational firm produces a large part of its
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output abroad. As environmental damages increase, the multinational tends
to face less regulation than the national firm and thus produces a higher out-
put. In this case, the government uses regulation policy to render national
production for export unprofitable, because it decreases aggregate welfare.
In our simple model, consumer surplus net of environmental damages
is always higher for multinational firms than the national firm when the
government cares only about consumers. When the government also takes
the producer surplus into account, consumers may be better off with national
than with multinational firms.
Appendices
A The lobbying game
We first show that the regulation level resulting from the game described in
Section 2.1 maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and profits.
Proposition 5 There is a subgame perfect equilibrium r∗, Cr
∗
(r) of the lob-
bying game such that
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r)− 1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
.
and
Cr
∗
(r) =

1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
if r = r∗.
1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
− ε(r) if r 6= r∗
.
ε is differentiable and has the following properties:
ε(r∗) = 0 = ε(r0); ε(r) > 0 ∀ r 6= r∗, r0; ε(r) ≤ 1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
. (4)
Proof: In the second stage, for any contribution schedule C (.), the politi-
cian chooses a policy r that maximizes Ŵ (r) + βC (r). By choosing r0, the
politician can obtain Ŵ (r0) + βC (r0). Here, C(r0) = 0, as the regulation
level r0 is by definition chosen as being welfare-maximizing without lobbying
payments. Thus, if a regulation r˜ 6= r0 is to be induced, it is necessary that
C (r˜) ≥ 1
β
(
Ŵ
(
r0
)− Ŵ (r˜)) .
Thus, any desired location r˜ can be induced with the following scheme:
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Cer (r) =

1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
if r = r˜
1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
− ε(r) otherwise.
with ε(r˜) = 0 = ε(r0); ε(r) > 0 ∀ r 6= r˜, r0; ε(r) ≤ 1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
.
Facing Cer (r), the politician obtains utility levels Ŵ (r0) for r0 and r˜ and
lower utility levels for all other values of r. Any desired regulation level r˜ can
be induced at minimal costs 1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r˜)
]
. Thus, the firm effectively
chooses r as
r∗ = arg max
r
Π (r)− 1
β
[
Ŵ
(
r0
)− Ŵ (r)] .
The corresponding contribution schedule is Cr
∗
.
The proposition has an intuitive implication.
Result 2 The regulation level chosen in the lobbying game is
arg max
r
Ŵ (r) + βΠ (r)
Proof: By Proposition 5,
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r)− 1
β
[
Ŵ (r0)− Ŵ (r)
]
.
Thus
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r) +
1
β
Ŵ (r) = argmaxr βΠ(r) + Ŵ (r).
Thus, regulation maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and firm profits.
B The location decisions of the multinational
B.1 Deriving Equation (2)
Using (1), profits in the different locations are
ΠN = p1x
1
1 + p2x
1
2 − r
(
x11 + x
1
2
)− tx12 (5)
ΠP = p1x
1
1 + p2x
2
2 − rx11 − F (6)
ΠC = p1x
2
1 + p2x
2
2 − tx21 − F .
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Simple calculations show that the optimal output levels are
x11 = max
(
a− r
2
, 0
)
, x12 = max
(
a− r − t
2
, 0
)
in regime N
x11 =
a− r
2
, x22 =
a
2
in regime P (7)
x21 =
a− t
2
, x22 =
a
2
in regime C.
Inserting these choices into (5), we obtain (2).
B.2 Locational Choices
We now derive locational choices (3). Using (2), we first make pairwise
comparisons of profits in the different regimes:
ΠN > ΠP ⇒
{
r2 + t2 + 2rt− 2ar − 2at+ 4F > 0 if r ≤ a− t
−a2 + 4F > 0 if a− t < r
ΠP > ΠC ⇒
{
t > r if r ≤ a
never if a < r
ΠN > ΠC ⇒

r2 + rt− 2ar + 2F > 0 if r ≤ a− t
r2 − t2 − a2 + 2at− 2ar + 4F > 0 if a− t < r ≤ a
0 > 2a2 − 2at+ t2 − 4F if a < r
For regime N to be chosen, we need ΠN > ΠP ∧ΠN > ΠC . For r ≤ a− t we
therefore need :
r2 + t2 + 2rt− 2ar − 2at+ 4F > 0 ∧ r2 + rt− 2ar + 2F > 0.
For a− t < r ≤ a, N is optimal if
−a2 + 4F > 0 ∧ r2 − t2 − a2 + 2at− 2ar + 4F > 0.
For r > a, the condition becomes
−a2 + 4F > 0 ∧ 0 > (a− t)2 + a2 − 4F.
Due to assumption 1(ii), a2 > 4F , the second and the third case cannot
occur. For the first case, simple derivations show that the two conditions can
be written as follows:
for r ≤ a− t : r < min
{
a− t−
√
a2 − 4F , a− t
2
− 1
2
√
(t− 2a)2 − 8F
}
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Defining
r1 ≡ a− t−
√
a2 − 4F and r2 ≡ a− t
2
− 1
2
√
(t− 2a)2 − 8F , (8)
the first statement in (3) follows.
For regime P to be chosen, we need ΠP > ΠN ∧ ΠP > ΠC . For r ≤ a − t ,
we thus require
r2 + t2 + 2rt− 2ar − 2at+ 4F < 0 ∧ t > r.
For r > a− t, the condition for P to be optimal is
−a2 + 4F < 0 ∧ t > r.
Again, straightforward calculations show that location P is chosen in the
following cases:
for r ≤ a− t : a− t−
√
a2 − 4F < r < t
for r > a− t : −a2 + 4F < 0 ∧ r < t
Using a2 − 4F > 0 and the fact that C is chosen in the remaining cases,
where neither N nor P will be chosen, leads to the equations (3) for l(r).
B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Define t1 = a−
√
a2−4F
2
and t2 = a−√a2 − 4F . Using (3) and (8): regimes N ,
P and C intersect at t1, and t2 corresponds to the value where the “ΠN =
ΠP”-line intersects with the x-axis.
C The Expressions for Welfare
Simple calculations show:
KN =
∫ x11
0
(a− q)dq − (a− x11)x11 =
(x11)
2
2
KP =
∫ x11
0
(a− q)dq − (a− x11)x11 =
(x11)
2
2
KC =
∫ x21
0
(a− q)dq − (a− x21)x21 =
(x21)
2
2
(9)
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DN = b(x11 + x
1
2)
2
DP = b(x11)
2
DC = 0 (10)
The welfare levels in the different locational regimes are then (taking Π
from (5)):
WN =
(x11)
2
2
+ γ[(a− x11)x11 + (a− x12)x12 − r(x11 + x12)− tx12]
−b(x11 + x12)2
W P =
(x11)
2
2
+ γ[(a− x11)x11 + (a− x22)x22 − r(x11)− F ]− b(x11)2
WC =
(x21)
2
2
+ γ[(a− x21)x21 + (a− x22)x22 − t(x21)− F ] (11)
Inserting the values for the output from above (equation (7)) and dis-
cerning the cases as above gives 19:
WN (r) =

if r ≤ a− t : γ
4
[2a2 + 2r2 + t2 + 2rt− 4ar − 2at]
+1
8
(a− r)2 − b
4
(2a− 2r − t)2
if a− t < r ≤ a : γ
4
(a− r)2 + 1
8
(a− r)2 − b
4
(a− r)2
if a < r : 0
W P (r) =
{
if r ≤ a : γ
4
[2a2 + r2 − 2ar − 4F ] + 1
8
(a− r)2
− b
4
(a− r)2
WC (r) =
γ
4
[
2a2 + t2 − 2at− 4F ]+ 1
8
(a− t)2 . (12)
D Regulation of national firms
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) The welfare levels corresponding to r ≥ a (No Production), r ≤ a − t
(Full Production) and a − t ≤ r ≤ a (No Exports) are given in equation
(12). We first show that the optimal r and the corresponding welfare levels
correspond to the values shown inTable 1.
(a1) Clearly, for r ≥ a, welfare is 0, independent of r.
19In regime P, we ignore the case r > a: In this case, the home market would not be
served, so that complete relocation is always preferred.
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(a2) For r ≤ a− t, firms produce both for both markets. Using the F.O.C
for unconstrained maximization of WN(r),
r =
a(−4γ − 1 + 8b) + t(−4b+ 2γ)
−4γ − 1 + 8b
is a candidate interior solution. However, this candidate is only in [0, a− t]
if 2b − 1
2
≤ γ < 2b − a
2(2a−t) . For γ < 2b − 12 , WN(r) is increasing in r on
[0, a− t], so that the optimum is r = a − t. For γ > 2b − a
2(2a−t) , W
N(r) is
decreasing in r, so the optimum is r = 0. Table 1 also contains the resulting
welfare levels.
(a3) For a − t ≤ r ≤ a, it turns out that WN(r) is always monotone,
resulting in an optimum r = a if γ < b− 1
2
and r = a− t if γ > b− 1
2
.
(b) Next, we compare welfare in the candidate solutions. (b1) If γ < γ1 ≡
b − 1
2
, the optimal solution is r = a − t in the full production regime and it
is r = a in the no exports regime. Comparing the expressions for welfare, we
obtain that r = a and W = 0. Hence, part (i) of the result follows.
(b2) If b− 1
2
< γ < γ2 ≡ 2b− 1
2
, the candidate optimum in both regimes
is r = a− t. Hence, part (ii) of the result follows.
(b3) If 2b− 1
2
≤ γ < γ3 ≡ 2b− a
2(2a−t) , the optimum in the full production
regime is given by the interior solution. It has to be compared with the
optimum in the No Exports regime (r = a − t). Using the corresponding
expressions in Table 1, it turns out that the full production optimum is
superior.
(b4) If γ > γ3, the optimum in the full production regime is r = 0, the
optimum in the No Exports regime is r = a − t. Using the corresponding
expressions for welfare in Table 1, it follows that full production is superior.
Together with (b3), this implies Part (iii) of the result.
range of γ r = WN =
γ < b− 1
2
a 0
b− 1
2
< γ < 2b− 1
2
a− t t2(γ
4
+ 1
8
− b
4
)
2b− 1
2
≤ γ < 2b− a
2(2a−t)
a(−4γ−1+8b)+t(−4b+2γ)
−4γ−1+8b
t1
(1+2ω)2
[
γ
4
(2ω2 + 2ω + 1) + ω
2
8
− b
4
]
2b− a
2(2a−t) < γ 0 (2a
2 + t(t− 2a))γ
4
+ a2 1
8
− b
4
(t− 2a)2
Table 1: Optimal values for the regulation r and corresponding welfare levels
for the national firm (ω := −4b+ 2γ)
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E Regulation of multinational firms
We specify Proposition 2 by including regulation levels.
Proposition 6 There exist γC1, γC2, γC3, γP2 such that:20
(i) For t ≤ t1, complete relocation arises if and only if γ ≤ γC1; there is no
relocation for γ > γC1. We obtain rC = a− t
2
− 1
2
√−8F − 4at+ 4a2 + t2 or
rN = 0.
(ii) For t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, there is complete relocation if and only if γ ≤ γC2. There
is partial relocation if and only if γC2 < γ ≤ γP2. There is no relocation if
and only if γ > γP2. We obtain rC = t, rP = a− t−√a2 − 4F or rN = 0.
(iii) For t > t2, there is complete relocation if and only if γ ≤ γC3. There is
partial relocation if and only if γC3 < γ. We obtain rC = t or rP = 0.
We will require several preliminary results.
Lemma 2: Welfare under complete relocation is
WC =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
)
(a− t)2 + γ
4
(
a2 − 4F) .
The corresponding minimal regulation is rC = a− t
2
−1
2
√−8F − 4at+ 4a2 + t2
or rC = t.
The result follows directly from (12). Intuitively, as the firm serves both
countries from abroad, there is no home country pollution. The home country
consumer surplus has to be calculated taking into account the transportation
costs t, and similarly for total profits. As WC is independent of regulation,
any value of r inducing complete relocation can be chosen. A natural candi-
date is the lowest possible value that induces C, thus the lower boundary of
the complete relocation region in the (t, r)-graph. These values for r can be
taken from Appendix B.
Lemma 3: (i) If γ < b− 1
2
the constrained optimal choice of r in P lies
on the upper boundary of P ( r = t). The resulting welfare level is
W P =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
)
(a− t)2 + γ
4
(
a2 − 4F)− b
4
(a− t)2
(ii) If γ > b − 1
2
the constrained optimal choice of r in P lies on the
lower boundary of P, which is r = a − t −√a2 − 4F in NPC and r = 0 in
20These quantities are defined in Appendix E.
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PC. The corresponding welfare levels are
W P−NPC =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
− b
4
)(
t+
√
a2 − 4F
)2
+
γ
4
(
a2 − 4F) (13)
W P−PC =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
− b
4
)
a2 +
γ
4
(
a2 − 4F) (14)
Proof of Lemma 3: The derivative of W P (r) is 1
4
(r − a) (2γ − 2b+ 1).
In regime P, r ≤ a. Therefore, W P is monotone increasing in r for γ < b− 1
2
and decreasing for γ > b− 1
2
. Thus in the former case the constrained opti-
mum in P lies on the upper boundary of P, in the latter case it lies on the
lower boundary (which is at a− t−√a2 − 4F or at 0).
We use these results and Proposition 1 to prove Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6:
We define the critical levels of γ as follows:
γC1 ≡ max
{−a+ 8ab− 4bt
4a− 2t ,
(t− 2a)(t+ 2b(t− 2a))
8F
}
γC2 ≡ max

b− 1
2
min
(
b(t+
√
a2−4F)2
t
√
a2−4F−2F+at − 12 , 2b− a2(a−t)
)
min
(
b(t+
√
a2−4F)2
t
√
a2−4F−2F+at − 12 ,
2b(2a−t)2−t(2a−t)
8F
)

γP2 ≡ max
 2b−
a
2(a−t) ,
2b(2t
√
a2−4F+4at−3a2−4F)−(t2+2t
√
a2−4F−4F)
2(2t
√
a2−4F+2at−8F)

γC3 ≡ ba
2
t(2a− t) −
1
2
(i) We show that for t < t1 complete relocation arises if and only if γ <
max
{
−a+8ab−4bt
4a−2t ,
(t−2a)(t+2b(t−2a))
8F
}
. We distinguish four cases:
(a) Let γ < b − 1
2
. In this case, WN = 0 according to Proposition 1, so
that WC > WN and complete relocation is optimal.
(b) Let b− 1
2
< γ < 2b− 1
2
: The optimality condition for the national firm
involves r = a− t and the resulting welfare level is given by t2 (γ
4
+ 1
8
− b
4
)
.
The resulting condition for WC > WN is
−bt
2
4
< (a2 − 2at)(γ
4
+
1
8
) +
γ
4
(a2 − 4F).
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Using t < a−
√
a2−4F
2
and thus a2 − 2at > 0, we derive that the inequality
always holds.
(c) For 2b− 1
2
< γ < −a+8ab−4bt
4a−2t , the national firm is optimally regulated
so that it produces for both countries. Again, we have WC > WN and
optimality of C.
(d) Finally, for −a+8ab−4bt
4a−2t < γ, the optimal regulation of the national
firm is r = 0. It turns out that WC > WN and complete relocation is op-
timal in case γ < (t−2a)(t+2b(t−2a))
8F
, otherwise no relocation N is optimal, i.e.
WN > WC .
(ii) We have to show that for t1 < t < t2 the location choice is made as
described in the proposition. We distinguish three cases:
(a) For γ < b− 1
2
, comparing W P and WC from Lemma 2 above and WN
from table 1 shows that C is optimal.
(b) For b − 1
2
< γ < 2b − a
2(2a−t) , comparison of the relevant expressions
for WN and W P from above shows that always W P > WN and that thus N
is never chosen. Comparing W P and WC leads to C being optimal for γ <
b(t+
√
a2−4F )2
2at+2t
√
a2−4F−4F − 12 and P for the opposite (calculations are straightforward
but tedious; cf. notes p22-25).
(c) For 2b − a
2(2a−t) < γ, comparison of all three location choices is nec-
essary. Pairwise comparison of the relevant expressions for welfare yields
WC > W P ⇔ γ < b(t+
√
a2−4F )2
4a−2t − 12 , WC > WN ⇔ γ < 2b(2a−t)
2−t(2a−t)
8F
, and
W P > WN ⇔ γ < 2b(2t
√
a2−4F+4at−3a2−4F )
2(2t
√
a2−4F+2at−8F ) −
(t2+2t
√
a2−4F−4F )
2(2t
√
a2−4F+2at−8F ) .
Combining all these conditions for optimality of a certain regime yields
part (ii) of the proposition.
(iii) We have to show that, for t > t2, there is complete relocation if and
only if γ ≤ γC3 ≡ ba2
t(2a−t) − 12 .
(a) For γ < b − 1
2
, Lemma 3(i) shows that the optimum in P is on the
upper boundary of P and the welfare level is given by the expression for W P
given there. Comparison with the expression for WC from Lemma 2 above
shows that WC > W P .
(b) For γ > b − 1
2
, welfare under partial relocation is given by equation
(14). It follows that WC > W P for b > (2γ+1)t(2a−t)
2a2
(as a2 > 2at − t2, this
is compatible with the first condition on γ: γ > b− 1
2
). Rearranging terms,
this translates into C for b − 1
2
< γ < ba
2
t(2a−t) − 12 and P for ba
2
t(2a−t) − 12 < γ
(as (a− t)2 > 0 we have b− 1
2
< ba
2
t(2a−t) − 12 and these ranges are possible).
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F The General Model
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We have to show that serving country 1 from country 2 is never worth-
while for r1 = 0, i.e. pi11(0; a, t) ≥ pi21(r2; a, t) for all r2. By Assumption
2c(ii) pi11(0; a, 0) = pi21(0; a, 0). By b(i) pi21(r2; a, 0) ≤ pi21(0; a, 0) for all
r2 ≥ 0. Thus pi11(0; a, 0) ≥ pi21(r2; a, 0). By b(iii) pi11(0; a, 0) = pi11(0; a, t)
and pi21(r2; a, 0) ≥ pi21(r2; a, t). Hence pi11(0; a, t) ≥ pi21(r2; a, t).
(ii) By (cii) pi11 (0; a, 0) = pi21 (0; a, 0) , therefore by Assumption (bi), pi11 (0; a, 0) ≥
pi21 (r2; a, 0) for all r2. Similarly, pi12 (0; a, 0) ≥ pi22 (r2; a, 0). Because F > 0,
therefore, relocation is never worthwhile for r1 = t = 0. By continuity (d),
the result also holds if r1 and t are sufficiently small.
(iii) By Assumption 2(a), pi1j (r1; a, t) = 0 for r1 ≥ rmax and j = 1, 2, so that
production in country 1 is not worthwhile. However, as pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F by
assumption, a firm that relocates complete obtains a positive profit. Thus,
complete relocation is worthwhile for r1 ≥ rmax.
(iv) First, we show that, if partial relocation is better than no relocation
and t = 0, then complete relocation is better than partial relocation: Partial
relocation necessarily requires pi12 (r1; a, 0) < pi22 (r2; a, 0). By Assumption
2(c) and (biii), pi12 (r1; a, 0) = pi11 (r1; a, 0) and pi22 (r2; a, 0) = pi21 (r2; a, 0).
Therefore pi11 (r1; a, 0) < pi21 (r2; a, 0) , so that serving country 1 from abroad
is more profitable than serving it from home. By continuity (assumption 2d),
there then exists a t∗ > 0 such that complete relocation is optimal for t < t∗.
Fix r2, a, F and t. By Assumption 2(e), limt→∞ pi12 (r1; a, t) = 0. Because
pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F , partial or complete relocation is optimal for sufficiently
high t and no relocation is never chosen.
Proof of Proposition 4
a) (i) is just a restatement of Assumption 3(d): As b → ∞, ri becomes
so high for both firms that there is no output. (ii) First consider the multi-
national firm. Assume it has completely relocated. Fix t > 0, so that the
output of the multinational firm is smaller than if there is no relocation by
Assumption 2(biii) and hence complete relocation involves a loss in consumer
surplus which is independent of b. By continuity of damages in b and in out-
puts (Assumption 3(d)), the damage reduction from relocation approaches
0 as b does. Thus, for every t > 0 there is a critical value of b below which
complete relocation is not optimal.
Moreover, for any given level of a, F and r2, if b is sufficiently small, the
environmental gains from regulation are small by Assumption 3(c). By As-
sumption 2(b) and 3(b), the costs of regulation in terms of reduced consumer
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surplus are positive and independent of t. Hence r1 becomes arbitrarily small
as b does. If t is also sufficiently small, the multinational firm’s gains from re-
duced transportation costs and regulation under partial relocation are small
by continuity of profits in ri and t (Assumption 2(d)), so that partial reloca-
tion is not worthwhile (due to the fixed, positive relocation costs involved).
Thus, there is no relocation.
For the national firm, for sufficiently small b, ri also becomes arbitrar-
ily small. By Assumption 2(f), home-country profits are positive. If t is
also sufficiently small, continuity of profits (Assumption 2(d)) and symmetry
(Assumption 2(c)) imply that it is worthwhile to serve the foreign market as
well. Thus, both firms are serving both markets and face the same regulation
to which they react in the same way.
b) (i) Fix all parameters except b. By Assumption 3(d), regulation optimally
reduces outputs to zero as b→∞. For b = 0, there is no regulation and the
firm has a positive home country output by Assumption 2(f). By continuity
of optimal regulation in b and continuity of outputs in ri, the intermediate
value theorem implies that there exists a minimal b ≥ 0 such that the produc-
tion of the national firm is optimally reduced to 0. By continuity of xji the
optimal regulation of the multinational firm at b involves complete relocation
with positive imports of country i if t and rj are sufficiently small: While the
advantage from reducing pollution by constraining either firm to producing
for the home country is the same, the multinational firm still generates a
positive consumer surplus whereas the national firm does not.
(ii) Let b be sufficiently small. By continuity of damages in outputs and b,
the benefits from regulation become arbitrarily small. Therefore the optimal
regulation level r1 is small for both the national and the multinational firm.
According to Assumption 2(e), for any r1 there exists a critical value of t such
that there is partial relocation of the multinational above this critical level.
The regulation of the national firm is also close to zero. However, the multi-
national firm produces for both countries. Because outputs are continuous in
regulation levels, the multinational firm produces less than the national firm.
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